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Introduction
One of the cornerstones shaping the OECD Model Tax Convention is the Employment Principle ("EP"). A person earning income from employment or personal services pays taxes in the country in which the activity is undertaken even if the person resides in a different country. At least this is the general rule. Deviating specific rules may apply in cases of posted or frontier workers or if services are rendered to governments. This paper questions the practice of relying on EP in international taxation and it offers a discussion of the alternatives.
The specific feature of EP is that it provides strong incentives for choosing employment where taxes are low. This has advantageous as well as disadvantageous implications. The orthodox theory of international taxation focuses on the latter. Its advocates, standing in the tradition of welfare economics, stress the efficiency cost of non-harmonized taxation. Labor will be inefficiently allocated if earned income is taxed differently at different places. The orthodox approach to taxation is closely connected to the view of governments acting as benevolent maximizers of social welfare. This approach has been criticized by those economists viewing tax authorities more in the role of a Leviathan pursuing its own objectives and wasting tax revenue.
The most prominent reference is Brennan and Buchanan (1980) . These economists stress the merits of competition among institutions, in general, and among countries, in particular. According to Brennan and Buchanan (1980, p. 186) , tax competition among separate jurisdictions is an objective to be sought in its own right.
Hence, the conclusion to be drawn from the literature 1 is that tax competition produces costs and benefits. The costs come from tax distortion and increase if individuals are allowed to avoid paying taxes by switching their place of employment. The benefits result from the efficiency enhancing effect of competition. Competition among tax authorities is a mechanism constraining the waste of tax revenue.
There have been attempts by Edwards and Keen (1996) and Rauscher (2000) to model the trade off between the costs and benefits of tax competition and to work out an optimal solution. The attempts must be considered to be disappointing for all those expecting clear-cut results. There is obviously no general rule saying that the costs of tax competition exceed the benefits or vice versa. As one may well expect, it all depends on behavioral parameters. A typical result is that of Edwards and Keen (1996) derived for a setting in which mobile capital is taxed by a small jurisdiction. Tax competition is costly on balance if the elasticity of the mobile tax base exceeds the Leviathan's marginal propensity to waste tax revenue.
With such a result in mind, it is not clear how one should assess EP as one of the cornerstones of the OECD Model Tax Convention. On the one hand, EP must be viewed as the cause of distortions in taxpayers' locational choices. On the other hand, it enables effective tax competition which promises to tame Leviathan governments.
Assessing EP is, therefore, not easy. However, it is not least a question of alternatives.
A conceivable alternative is suggested by the practice of the United States not to release its citizens from the obligation to pay home taxes while residing abroad. This is the so-called Nationality Principle. U.S. citizens cannot escape home taxes just by 1 For a recent survey see Oates (2002 interpreted as immobile labor. The implicit assumption is that mobility is an innate ability.
Production output is an all-purpose private good serving as numéraire. There is an additional good G which is interpreted as a public good and which is consumed by is not an unavoidable cost. It is expenditure benefiting the Leviathan only. For mobile and immobile labor, it is pure waste preventing the public sector from producing at its efficiency frontier. For the sake of simplicity, such waste is assumed to be strictly proportional in G. This represents a slight difference to Edwards and Keen (1996) and Rauscher (2000) , who model the structure of public expenditures as an endogenous decision. Proportionality of waste, though, is not the only simplification adopted for the following analysis. The standard framework of the literature is further simplified with respect to the Leviathan's objective function, which will be additive between its own consumption, C, and the utilitarian welfare of labor, U. The idea is that the Leviathan has to trade off its own consumption against the public support for its administration and that both objectives are perfectly substitutable. Hence, the δ equals zero, the emigrant stops paying taxes abroad at the very moment she emigrates. A priori, one cannot rule out the possibility that a country finds it optimal to treat immigrants and emigrants non-symmetrically. As to the home country, this would mean that the delay in integration, i δ , comes to differ from the delay in releasing emigrants from the obligation to pay home taxes, e δ . Non-harmonized parameters of delay in the countries of immigration and emigration would, however, result either in double taxation or in a temporary exemption from taxation. Both cases are
problematic. An obvious objective of international tax coordination should therefore be the equalization of delays,
. In this special case, the tax liability of migrants shows up as the convex combination of home and foreign tax rates. This property allows one to interpret DI as a convex combination of EP and OP and the latter principles as polar.
Mobile labor is assumed not to consume the public good G. Hence, it makes sense to model the migration decision of mobile labor by pure net-wage arbitrage. If migration is from abroad to home, arbitrage is between 
with appropriate choices of dots ( • , o ) = (i,e) or (e,i), respectively.
Tax revenue is used to finance government expenditure. In stating the condition of budget balance, one has to differentiate again between immigration and emigration.
Let L denote the initial endowment of mobile labor in the home country. For the sake of brevity, it is said to be mobile native labor. Immigration to the home country prevails if mobile labor employed exceeds native labor, L L < , and if mobile native labor has no incentive to emigrate. The latter is ensured if (1 e ) holds with " ≥ " substituted for "=". Given immigration to the home country, the government budget is
and by some (1 i ) with " ≤ " substituted for "=".
The description of the model is finished by defining the home country's aggregate private consumption. In doing so, it is important to differentiate between two conceptions. One is taxpayers' consumption and the other is natives' consumption. In order to derive private consumption, one has to add up the incomes after tax that accrue to the various suppliers of labor. In the case of taxpayers' consumption, this is
income accruing to immigrants, though only to the amount that they are taxpayers in the home country,
Adding up these terms and making use of (2 i )
By similar reasoning, taxpayers' private consumption adds up to
if labor is emigrating from home. Note that immobile labor income is subsumed under taxpayers' income although it is not liable to pay positive tax. This makes sense as immobile labor is affected by budget policy via public expenditures and it is only for the sake of simplicity that it is assumed to pay zero tax.
The competing conception is natives' consumption. It is obtained by adding up the incomes after tax accruing to natives. In the case of immigration, this is income earned
in the case of emigration. Below, natives will be the reference for welfare comparisons. Natives are, however, not necessarily the individuals whose political support the Leviathan can be assumed to seek. Neither are taxpayers. If anything, a Leviathan government will seek the support of voters and it is the question in the modeling whether voters should be assumed to be natives or taxpayers. Arguments can be found for both.
Internationally, the common rule is that voting rights are tied to citizenship and not to 
Taxpayers' support
Assuming first that the Leviathan government seeks the support of taxpayers, the government can be assumed to maximize cG + V(G) 
A first noteworthy result is that i δ =1 implies V'=1. The latter condition characterizes efficient consumption of the public good while i δ =1 stands for a regime in which immigrants are not taxed as required by OP. Efficient consumption of public goods
may not be what one would expect to result from Leviathan activity. Still, it makes sense in the present model. The Leviathan has no reason to deviate from the first-best level of G because from its perspective, there is no efficiency cost of taxation.
Immigrants are not taxed anyway and the tax on mobile natives is infra-marginal.
Quasi-linearity of the utilitarian welfare function ensures that Leviathan activity has some private income effect only. The level of taxation chosen by the Leviathan is too high, but the level of public good consumption is at its first best.
Unfortunately, things are more complicated if 1 ≠ δ i . Differentiating (1 i ), (2 i ), and (5) implicitly and solving for G',L' and t' as functions of i δ produces some complex expressions, the interpretation of which is anything but straightforward. However, letting i δ tend to one yields the following limit expressions:
It is suggestive to address the case of some i δ close to one as one of "large delay".
This allows one to interpret (6) - (8) A priori, one might speculate that aggregate welfare of natives, This extended definition is underlying the following discussion.
The analysis is complicated by the fact that corner solutions cannot be discarded if welfare is to be maximized. Quite to the contrary, if the Leviathan propensity to waste tax revenue vanishes, c=0, OP turns out to be optimal. That is, constitutional design should only target tax efficiency in absence of tax waste. Proposition 1: If the Leviathan's propensity, c, to waste tax revenue is positive, eventually subjecting immigrant labor to home taxation, i.e., implementing DI with i δ large but smaller than one, is a better policy than not subjecting immigrant labor to home taxation and implementing OP. Implementing OP is optimal only for c=0.
For a proof, just insert (6) -(8) into (9) and make use of V'=1. One then obtains
which fails to be positive and proves the proposition. Note that the larger c is, the more negative W' is and the stronger the case for opting against OP and in favor of DI. The following figure illustrates why welfare comparisons are difficult if values of i δ that are not close to one are being considered.
When moving from i δ =1 to some lower value, essentially two effects have to be traded off in a welfare analysis. One is the social cost of tax distortion and the other is the social cost of wasteful government. As the former is an effect of second order in 1-i δ while the latter an effect of first order, no definite welfare comparison is possible between low and large values of i δ or -expressing the same differently -between strong and weak tax competition. One can only say that for c>0, some tax competition ( i δ <1) dominates the absence of any tax competition ( i δ =1).
The case for DI would be stronger if both mobile and immobile labor could be shown to benefit when moving from OP to DI. This is, however, not true. Immobile labor loses, as can easily be demonstrated by means of (6) and (7):
There are two reasons why immobile labor loses when introducing tax competition and moving from OP to DI. First, the supply of the public good decreases and, second, immobile wage income shrinks when immigrant mobile labor is taxed. The latter results from the well-known effect that taxes on perfectly mobile factors are shifted backward to the immobile ones and that such shifting is costly in terms of efficiency.
Propostion 2: Immobile labor loses when moving marginally from OP to DI.
Natives' support
In the present setting, policy is evaluated by measuring the welfare of natives. Hence, one may well conjecture that superior results are obtained in terms of welfare if the Leviathan is forced to seek the support of natives and not that of taxpayers. The scope for pursuing some selfish policy is constrained if the Leviathan is forced to include the correct aggregate of labor income in its objective function. Such a conjecture turns out to be correct. 
Assuming that the Leviathan seeks the support of natives, it maximizes cG + V(G)
+ N i X in G, t, L subject to L L ≤ , (1 i ), (2 i ),
Optimal delay in the case of emigration
The task of designing the optimal delay in releasing emigrant labor from the liability to pay home taxes is analyzed along the same lines developed for the case of immigration. Assuming that the Leviathan seeks the support of taxpayers, it δ =1, one can show that e δ =1 is a stationary point of the welfare function of the home country's natives. In order to see whether it is a local maximum or minimum, the technique introduced for the proof of Proposition 3 is applied. That is, when differentiating (1 e ), (2 e ), and (11) implicitly, all terms of second order in 1-e δ are ignored. Note that this technique allows one to ignore the RHS of (11). The LHS is of second order in 1-e δ , which follows from inserting
and from noting ) )( 1 ( '
. When ignoring terms of second order, the derivatives of the endogenous variables turn out to be as follows:
As in the case of immigration, increasing e δ to large values boosts employment at home and increases the consumption of the public good. The reason is that by increasing e δ , the incentive to avoid paying home taxes by emigrating is reduced. The marginal change in t at e δ =1, however, differs in sign from the immigration case. The RHS of (14) is negative, whereas it is positive in (8). Increasing e δ to large values thus makes the Leviathan reduce taxes in the country of emigration, whereas it increases taxes in the country of immigration. This must be interpreted as saying that the Leviathan enjoys more strength under conditions of immigration. This interpretation finds further support with the following welfare analysis.
w with respect to e δ , ignoring second-order terms, and plugging in (12) and (13) yields
Obviously, the sign of W' is ambiguous. The first term of the bracketed expression is positive while the second is negative. The larger c is, the larger the latter term becomes.
Proposition 4: If the Leviathan's propensity, c, to waste tax revenue is sufficiently large, it is not optimal to adopt OP. It increases natives' welfare instead if emigrant labor is eventually released from the liability to pay home taxes. Adopting OP is a local optimum only if c takes on small values.
As marginal welfare W' vanishes at e δ =1, there is no efficiency gain to be reaped by a marginal move towards DI. Setting e δ marginally below one results in pure redistribution from immobile to mobile labor. The marginal gain of mobile native labor can easily be determined by making use of (12) and (14):
Hence, the marginal gain equals tax revenue collected from mobile labor employed at home.
One may wonder how results change if the Leviathan is assumed to seek the support of natives instead of taxpayers. As it turns out, the changes are only marginal and not upsetting. All that happens is that the variable * w disappears from the formulas (13) -(15). As the foreign wage rate * w appears jointly with the factor 1+c, this has to be interpreted as follows. The effect that selfish government behavior has on marginal changes in G, t, and W is dampened if the Leviathan's power is checked by a native electorate. This does not come as much of a surprise given what is already known to hold for the immigration case. The only difference is that the effect of switching from a taxpayers' electorate to a natives' electorate turns out to be less pronounced in the emigration case.
Summary and conclusions
The practice of taxing labor in the country of employment has been questioned in the Distributive policy has been modeled as being non-paretian. In other words, taxes modeled are a pure burden on mobile labor. Again, such an assumption is debatable.
An alternative would be to derive distributive policy from mobile taxpayer's altruism (Pauly, 1973) . Redistribution would then amount to a public good consumed by mobile taxpayers. The discussion would need to be qualified appropriately. Taxes are well-known not to distort locational choices if they can be rationalized by the Benefit Principle. In fact, taxes need to be levied employment-based if the cost of providing public goods to a marginal migrant is related to employment and if allocational efficiency is to be enhanced. This is just what the application of marginal cost pricing suggests in the case of mobile labor.
An interesting qualification is made by Hange and Wellisch (1998) . In a model of benevolent first-best welfare maximization, one would have to endow jurisdictions with the power to balance their public budget without distorting locational choices.
The implication is that jurisdictions should have a tax on fixed factors at their disposal.
As Hange et al. show, quite the contrary is optimal if governments are assumed to pursue selfish objectives. The idea is that a tax on fixed factors gives the Leviathan leeway to abuse its power of taxation. Interjurisdictional tax competition does not exert any restraining force in this case. The Leviathan should only have access to tax instruments which can be avoided by taxpayers.
Finally, one may rightly question the perfect mobility assumption of which the analysis made such heavy use. Clearly, perfect mobility lacks realism. There are moving costs which have to be offset by migrants against income gains. Costs of mobility are a definite obstacle to the efficient allocation of labor. However, they do not make the present analysis obsolete. Taxes retain there distortive potential on the margin even in the presence of moving costs.
The propensity to move and the distortions exerted by taxes on locational choices raise a number of empirical questions. They cannot be dealt with adequately at the level of a footnote. For a comprehensive recent survey -albeit in German -see Feld (2000) . See also Oates 2002. The bottom line to this literature is that the empirical evidence on the effect that taxes, social benefits, and public goods have on residence choices is somewhat mixed. In the United States, the recipients of social assistance obviously strongly respond to the transfer level. In other countries, notably in Switzerland, social transfers play a less important role. As to taxes, the empirical evidence tends to be reversed. Local taxes have been shown to have strong effects on residence choices in Switzerland. This is especially the case for high income earners, who, incidentally, also react positively to local public expenditures. Low-income earners are not as strongly influenced by taxes in their choice of residence. In the United States, things seem to be different, which could be due to the fact that Sates and local authorities are financed through income taxes only to a minor extent. Hence, from an empirical point of view, it is not fully clear how important the distorting effects of taxes on migration are. Still, economic theory suggests not playing them down but rather thinking carefully about how to assign taxpayers to jurisdictions in a world of increasing mobility.
Appendix
In order to prove Proposition 3, it is necessary to solve ( 
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The first two terms on the RHS are positive while the third is negative. Proposition 3 is obtained after signing the RHS.
